CONTROL OF MONEY MARKET
We have shown in the previous paragraph the value of the liquidity report to limit cumulative positive or negative cash flows and to control different Forex operators in their adherence to established limits. There is an additional advantage associated with this report. In many cases, the liquidity report will reflect fundamental funding techniques of a specific country. This information can be useful to review personnel in the headquarters of international banks. A positive cash flow in one- to three-month local currency (DM). This is not surprising because a German branch naturally makes loans in German marks which it expects to collect a few months later; the collections create the positive cash flow in the DM column. We also see negative cash flows for U.S. dollars in Block I. They can only be the result of dollar deposits received which must be repaid over the next few months, thus creating the negative cash flows in the US$ column. At this point, the examiner of the liquidity report may be concerned because the German branch is apparently lending marks and borrowing dollars, which would make it necessary to maintain a very sizable net overbought position in marks against dollars.
However, as we study Block 2, we recognize an outflow of marks in the one- to three-month area and an approximately corresponding inflow of dollars. These cash flows are the result of forward Forex trading exchange transactions. Now the whole report begins to make sense.
The branch made loans in marks, borrowed dollars, converted these dollars into marks in the spot exchange market, and covered in the forward exchange market view, i.e., sold forward marks and purchased forward dollars. This means that the branch has no net exchange position and a cumulative cash flow position which results, by and large, from demand deposits. The cash flows from assets and liabilities and exchange purchases and sales are almost balanced. The explanation for this funding approach must be that the branch finds it cheaper to borrow dollars and swap them into marks than simply to borrow marks.
We have described tools to limit and control the credit, rate, and liquidity risks. The aggregate limit proposed here does not control any particular risk which would not be controlled already by one of the above-mentioned limits. The aggregate limit is a limit for total unliquidated exchange contracts outstanding with all other banks, corporations, and individuals. It is strictly a volume indicator and functions as a red flag whenever there is an increase in unliquidated exchange contracts. For example, if the aggregate contracts outstanding increase without a corresponding increase in earnings and without any other good explanation, and if this increase in volume is accompanied by a general increase in operating costs such as telephone and telex expenses, a careful examination of the entire operation seems advisable.
On the other hand, there may be a good reason for changes in outstanding balances and, therefore, in limits. For example, the volume of unliquidated exchange contracts rose substantially when floating rates became a reality after August 1971. Importers and exporters who had previously handled their exchange needs on a spot basis whenever they needed a certain currency then began to protect their interests through forward purchases and sales. A spot contract is settled within a few business days, but a forward contract, by definition, is not settled until several months in the future. Therefore, the aggregate limit for unliquidated exchange contracts had to be substantially increased, and there was a very good reason to do so.
The quotation given by a bank when compared with the market, or the quotations that most other people are making can yield information on the type of transaction that the bank wishes to perform, i.e., whether it prefers to buy or sell. Such a comparison may also convey some information as to the opinion of the bank about the future forex trends in that currency. For example,
Bid Offer
Standard market quotation 10 9
Specific bank's quotation 15 13
This difference in numbers can be explained in either of two ways:
(1) The bank wishes to sell, or
(2) it thinks that the market price will come down.
For the customer dealing with the bank, the 9-13 quotes are better than the market if the customer wants to purchase the currency. The bank's quote makes it possible for the customer to purchase at 13, instead of at the standard rate of 15. If the customer wishes to sell the currency, and then the market offers a better alternative than the specific bank. Thus, the quotation from the bank is designed to give an incentive to people to purchase from this specific bank. This incentive is justified either if the bank has excess funds in that currency, or if it expects the price of the forex trading currency to drop. As to the other side of the quotation, if any ill-informed market participant sells to the bank at 9, the bank still has the opportunity to resell the acquired funds at the market rate of 10. In other words, although the bank basically does not want to buy, it still does so happily at 9. The forex institute market is bidding 10, and the bank can sell immediately at 10. The degree of departure of the bank's rate from the prevailing rate will indicate the extent to which one of the explanations presented above holds true for the particular bank. Thus, in this case, if the bank were really pressured to sell the currency, it might go so far as to quote 9-12.
If the bank's quotation were 12-16, it would clearly show that either the bank wants to be a buyer of the currency or that it expects its value to increase. Again, if the bank were very eager to maintain this posture, the quotations would likely go as far as 13-16.5 It is obvious from this discussion that the party quoting the rate is in an advantageous position, provided the quotes know what the market exchange rate is. The trader can choose the bid and offer rates to quote in such a way that nothing can go wrong. The trader either accomplishes the objective pursued with a quote at odds with the market or makes a profit in an involuntary transaction suggested by an ill-informed trading partner.
One should be forewarned; however, that one danger of taking the previous paragraphs literally is that the techniques of using bid and offer risk rates intelligently are well known by the market. Therefore, one potential problem is that of second-guessing the motivation of the bank. Given that the bank knows that variations in quoted rates will be interpreted in a certain fashion, it may choose to use this conduit to convey special information which may not coincide with what the bank actually wishes to do.
There is one additional advantage in favor of the trader. Every time that someone else responds to the trader's quote, information is gained. For example, the calling party may answer by bidding in between the prices quoted by the trader. This procedure is not uncommon. If the quoted rate is 10 bids and 14 offers, the calling party may state a wish to sell at 11. The trader, the quoting party, mayor may not improve the bid rate from 10 to 11. Even if the trader chooses not to buy at 11, information has been acquired about one market participant.
If the Deutsche marks fall to $0.45, the manufacturer pays out only $450,000; however, he sells the contract for $50,000 less than what he paid for it, and the bank debits his credit line for the difference. Thus, there is no net gain, either. The forex currency exposure has been effectively hedged, and the payment is for the anticipated amount, no more, no less, whether measured in Deutsche marks or in dollars.
This example is called a "perfect hedge," which is something that is rarely attainable. The gain or loss from a hedge transaction seldom exactly offsets the gain or loss of the exchange rate move. The contract and the currency may change values at slightly different rates. Also, there are possible tax implications involving the market transaction, and there are always transaction costs to consider. Regardless, if the hedge is properly constructed, these factors are insignificant compared to the reduction in risk exposure.
The above example illustrates a problem of much greater magnitude than the imprecision of offsetting gains and losses. This problem underlies all forex institute risk management programs. Simply put, should the hedge be entered in the first place? Does it benefit the manufacturer? Only hindsight reveals the answer.
If the dollar made a major advance against the Deutsche mark while the hedge was in place, it would produce a loss of major proportions. The fact that it was offset by a savings somewhere else may not be enough justification, especially when the loss, or "hedge burden" as it is sometimes known, is being explained to a senior manager who has had no input in the risk management program. This is the single biggest obstacle to forex trading currency management. Unless there are clearly defined objectives, safeguards in place, and clear communications among the various levels of management, a hedging program can end up as a non-starter at best and a financial disaster at worst.
The record is littered with casualties. In 1984, Lufthansa had placed a major purchase order for airliners from a U.S. firm. Its economists were forecasting a stronger dollar. Perhaps aware of Laker Air's experience, it locked up the
Deutschemark/dollar exchange rate with a forward contract. The economists guessed wrong. In one year, Lufthansa had lost somewhere around $150 million, and one or two financial managers reported by lost their jobs. Separately, the chairman of Porsche found himself unemployed two years later. He had engineered the company into a dependence on the U.S. money market for 61 % of its revenue without hedging against a downturn in the dollar. Porsche suffered a major financial setback as a result. It was about that same time that Volkswagen began sorting through a loss of $259 million which lined the pockets of a group of currency traders who had falsified documents in an illegal "bucket shop" operation.
Meanwhile, in the United States, Zenith Electronics Corporation was explaining concept to its stockholders a $13 million loss on a forward contract. Jerry K. Pearlman, chairman and president, remarked that "it's the kind of mistake we will never make again."4 It's a "damned if you do and damned if you don't" situation, and it's no wonder that U.S. corporate officers would just rather forget the whole thing.